“I’ve given you fourteen years of earnings. I have one bad quarter. This is how you respond?”
On June 11, Richard S. Fuld Jr., CEO of Lehman Brothers, sat down to lunch with a half-dozen of Lehman’s senior investment bankers. Since the fall of Bear Stearns in March, Fuld had been struggling to keep “the mother ship,” as Fuld liked to call his firm, from taking on water, but with little success. The stock was sinking quickly. In just a few months, Lehman had given back ten years of gains. Two days before the meeting, Lehman announced a second-quarter loss of $2.8 billion, its first negative quarter in fourteen years, causing the stock to plummet again, 21 percent in a couple of days. Fuld’s own people, their net worth evaporating, were losing confidence. Hugh Skip McGee, the global head of investment banking and for years a loyal Lehman employee, had requested the meeting. They gathered in Fuld’s private dining room on the 32nd floor of Lehman’s Seventh Avenue headquarters, a somber mahogany-paneled room, with a list of several demands, chief among them a change in leadership.“The board of directors is going to be under pressure,” said one banker. And then added, “It has to deliver a head to the street.”
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Daca va intereseaza, iata intreg articolul. E foarte bine scris, intr'un captivant stil de "whodunit" ...
16 comments:
Interesant articol, bine scris, dinamic. Mersi Sehe.
atunci poate ne explici si noua CE ai inteles si ce crezi ...
Unii zic ca de aici a inceput totul, ... ca daca Lehman Brother ar fi fost salvat (precum sint acuma toate institutiile), nu s-ar fi pornit tavalugul ...
Doamna profesoara,
Daca am scris ca este interesant, inseamna ca mi-a trezit interesul si nu inseamna ca am intzeles mai mult decat altzii.
Ceea ce este clar este ca situatzia era atat de disperata incat chiar si un ajutor financiar ar fi amanat doar sfarsitul.
Poate a fost cazul sa se sparga buboiul si sa se dea un exemplu... astea sunt lucruri pe care poate o sa le aflam peste ani si ani.
In tot cazul, lipsa de supraveghere a administratziilor precum si a congresului a celor care au facut bani usori a contribuit si ea.
In Israel cand capetzi o ipoteca nu potzi sa pui numai 10-20% din valoarea casei si restul este imprumut. Deasemeni banca este obligata sa se uite ce capabilitate de a plati ratele ai.
A fost chiar o vreme cand trebuiai sa aduci 5 garantzi pentru orice fel de ipoteca, atat de dur era controlul.
Cu alte cuvinte, in Israel nu s-ar fi putut produce asa o criza care astazi costa atat de mult.
Nu sunt sigur că Lehman Bros ar fi trebuit ajutată. Partea proastă e că Administraţia nu are o poziţie coherentă şi se cam fâţâie în zig zag cu "ajutorul". Dealtfel economista Anna Schwartz (nee 1915), ascuţită la minte ca un brici, a dat un interviu interesant în Wall Street Journal în Octombrie
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB122428279231046053.html
Ea e de părere că băncile nu duc lipsă de bani şi nu e nevoie să fie ajutate. Asta era valabil în 1929 şi nu s-a făcut atunci. Acum e altă situaţie.
Interview cu economista Anna Schwartz (nee 1915), ... la care face referire ScS.
Exista un articol intr'un ziar canadian, cu Intrebare-Raspuns, legat de criza ...,
de ex:
This whole downward spiral seemed to start with U.S. subprime mortgages. What exactly are they?
Subprime mortgages are home loans made to people who would not, under normal circumstances, be ideal candidates to get a mortgage - thus they are "subprime." These are individuals who have a higher risk of defaulting on their loan, such as those who have been delinquent in making payments in the past, or people with a bankruptcy on their credit record, or those who simply don't have a credit history.
Starting around 2005, U.S. lenders loosened their rules and began granting mortgages to borrowers who provided very little evidence of their income and ability to repay. Many of these mortgages had very low initial interest rates, for the first six months to three years, but when that period ended the payments jumped sharply. Borrowers were led to believe that they would be able to refinance their homes at this point because the value of the property would have increased. But the slump in the housing market meant that didn't happen. As a result many people - especially those who had not been completely frank about their income levels - defaulted on their mortgages and lost their homes.
Cind am cumparat, pe vremuri, un apartament in NY, am fost scrutinati la singe si a trebuit sa platim 20% down payment ...
Cind am cumparat un apartament in Amsterdam,in acest mileniu, am fost destul de scrutinati, insa ni s-a acordat un imprumut de 120% (incl. lucrarile de renovare, ei s-au oferit, noua nici prin cap nu ne-a trecut).
In Olanda si in Anglia, imprumuturile hypotecare sint foarte "creative" (eu m-am ferit de ofertele lor ca de dracu')
De ex. se ofera posibilitatea sa imparti imprumutul in doua,
(a)-la o parte platesti si dobinda si principalul,
(b)-la cealalta parte platesti doar dobinda ...
(deci dupa 30 de ani ramii cu casa 80% neplatita)...,
ceea ce convine celor care stiu ca o vor vinde in 3-4 ani, adica unor "expati" (ca noi), fiindca dobinda se scade din venitul pe care platesti taxe (50%) ...
Insa tipii au incercat sa ne ofere posibilitatea ca ... pe portiunea (b) ... principalul sa fie expus speculatiei de piatza, si astfel ... imprumutul se plateste "practic singur" !!!
si veneau cu studii si argumente stiintifice cum toate stocurile vor creste ...
Cunosc oameni care s-au lasat atrasi de aceasta formula.
Taman cind toate stocurile s-au prabusit ...
In Anglia a fost o tragedie ...
Inca un punct:
In Israel bancile nu sunt obligate sa dea ipoteci celor care nu au capacitatea de a returna in ratele stabilite de banca.
Cel care ajuta este direct guvernul care da un ajutor tinerelor perechi bazat pe un anumit punctaj care depinde daca ai servit in armata, daca ai multzi fratzi/surori in familie, daca ai copii si catzi ai, etc.
Ceea ce am vrut sa spun este ... ca eu NU cred ca aceasta criza financiara este datorata faptului ca s-au dat credite unor sarantoci ca sa-si cumpere niste cocioabe (de catre cei de stinga, cum sustine alamar ...)
NU!! La un moment dat, s-a liberalizat regimul de acordare a creditelor,... insa porcariile la care s-au dedat bancile si institutiile in urma acestor liberalizari a depasit limitele bunului simt ...
Oameni cu salarii mari au primit credite pentru care trebuiau sa faca plati lunare de 4000 $. Astia nu erau sarantoci ... doar niste cretini care nu s-au gindit ca iti poti pierde jobul, ca stocurile mai si scad ... si s-au lasat atrasi in curse.
In 2005 se propusese o masura de interzicere a creditelor fara down payment, ... si totusi din cauza presiunilor bancilor si ale institutiilor financiare, aceasta propunere nici nu a atins Congresul ...
Oy Vei for Baby-Boomers:
"... For most people who weren’t counting on a paycheck from Lehman Brothers, the central drama of the 2008 collapse has been the more personal matter of their retirement savings and their property value. Unfortunately, those two things constitute the bulk of most families’ net worth. That’s especially true for baby boomers who played by the rules, doing what financial advisors suggested while planning for a retirement that is fast approaching: investing the 401(k) to grow over time; buying property to build up equity with every monthly payment. Today, that wisely diversified 401(k) has fallen by a third and the 75 percent of that house that a 55-year-old boomer might own has shrunk by a similar figure. And with it, the prospect of a non-penurious old age, the basic reward for a life of hard work ...
For a lot of people, the answer has involved no shortage of panic and blame. Like accounts of machine-gun rampages, media accounts of financial turmoil now often feature a psychologist offering coping advice to a panicked public.
The American Psychological Association’s annual stress report, in June, called money the number-one fear. By September, after the crisis, calls to hotlines were up. Reporting on the stress captured a wistful tone, a farewell to something that had seemed certain. “I'll probably be working for the rest of my life," one woman told the Washington Post. "Some golden years."
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din "Only Yesterday...", by Michael Schaffer
Subprime....
Si Mai.......
Pentru Mica Balerina..........
Alamar nu gresheshte......
nici de data asta.....
Uite aici cite ceva
Nostim Moshule ca mi-ai zis "balerina" ... fiindca tocmai pregatesc o postare cu o balerina si un economist ...
Am descoperit o discutie interesanta pe blogul Hot Air, pe acesta tema:
unul din participanti zice: ...
Two months ago, I noted how a September 1999 article in the Los Angeles Times praising the Clinton administration’s enforcement efforts of the Community Reinvestment Act inadvertently showed how they created the housing bubble by praising all of the excesses of the White House and Congress.
Se face referire si la articolul din anul 2000 adus de Mos Grigore ... despre care se zice:
Another article from the following year that took a much-less complimentary look at the CRA and government use of it — and predicted almost exactly what would follow eight years later.
Cele mai interesante INSA, mi s-au parut comentariile la discutie ... Sint multe, insa unul (Jazzman) se detaseaza.
Intii zice:
"80% of sub-prime loans came from financial institutions that weren’t fully governed by the CRA. 50% of the loans came from institutions that weren’t governed by the CRA at all. CRA regulated institutions made subprime loans at significantly lower rates than independent mortgage companies. Coercion had nothing to do with why these institutions made bad loans. They made these loans for the same reason that Alan Greenspan endorsed these loans: (a) they were taken in by the housing bubble, and so didn’t regard default as a significant risk; (b) they could transfer risk through the poorly regulated market in packaged tradeable securities. Incidentally, sub-prime loans made by CRA-governed institutions were also far less likely to be packaged into the complex (and, it turns out, misleadingly rated) mortgage-backed securities at the heart of the credit crisis."
Jazzman on November 17, 2008 at 6:07 PM,
iar apoi, ...
ceea ce face ca discutia sa se aprinda si sa continue doar intre doi participanti, Jazzman zice urmatoarele:
"The picture you have of the subprime crisis is wrong on so many levels that I don’t even know where to begin responding to you. So I apologize if this ends up being a little long and rambling.
First, it seems like you’re saying that CDO’s were over-rated because of investors’ unwarranted confidence in Fannie/Freddie. This is absurd. The truly disastrous sub-prime loans (no downpayment, no proof of income, etc.) could not legally have been backed by the GSEs, since they fail to meet federal underwriting standards. The prevalence of these loans is entirely attributable to private-label securitization, fuelled by a faith in the persistence of the bubble. CDOs backed by these loans were over-rated, but that paper could not have passed through the hands of Fannie/Freddie. So your claim that Fannie’s AAA rating is solely or primarily to blame for the mispricing of risk is just evidently false.
Second, the claim that securitization has nothing to do with this crisis is even more absurd. Now that we’ve dispensed of the myth that the GSEs are responsible for the failure of credit rating, we should ask, “Why were products backed by such dodgy assets given such good credit ratings?” And the answer is that the products were ingeniously created so that the risk was extremely diversified and massively overcollateralized. But the models used to calculate the risk didnt completely account for the ludicrously lax underwriting standards in the home loan market, or anticipate the country-wide housing slump.
So the creation of these complex securities, and the consequent transfer of risk from agents actually involved with the housing market and aware of the subprime situation to institutions with nothing to go on but the rating agencies’ inadequate models, is a crucial factor in the credit crunch.
To blame it on Fannie/Freddie or the CRA is to betray either a lack of understanding of the financial situation or a hyperpartisan lack of concern for the facts."
Jazzman on November 17, 2008 at 8:27 PM
cititi in continuare, ... comentariile sint nostime.
Shehe.......cred ca am postat ambele puncte de vedere...........greed si activismul social..care predomina e greu de spus pentru unul din afara.....
dar se vede rezultatu' foarte clar!
uite Moshule de ce eu nu dau 2 bani pe "stinga/dreapta" ... mai ales azi ...
se zice ca dreapta este cu "free economy" iar stinga cu "regulated economy" ...
cind colo guvernele republicane au fost cele care au instituit cele mai multe regulamentari ale sistemului bancar (si bine au facut, pina la un anumit punct ...)
apoi au venit democratii (Clinton) si au deregularizat bancile (si bine au facut, dar tot pina la un anumit punct) ...
deci pina acum am vorbit de "activismul" cum zici tu ...
restul este "greed", si ala dn pacate este de toate culorile politice, stinga dreapta, republican democrat, alb negru etc etc ...
Articolul tau este din 2000 (sf.erei Clinton)...
Pina atunci, prostia aia de CRA initiata de Carter, nu a avut nici un efect, ...
abia in momentul cind s-a trecut la un libertinaj bancar global ...
a inceput "greed'ul" sa-si arate talentul creativ ...
Pe timpul lui Clinton toti erau fericiti, ca doar toate valorile erau in ascensiune ...,
si asa se face ca mecanismele folosite pentru imprumuturi ipotecare la sarantoci, au inceput sa fie aplicate si la nesarantoci, dar tot pe baza de baloane de sapun ...,
inspre sfirsitul domniei lui Clinton, au inceput sa apara
primile semne de pericol si risc ...
insa pe timpul lui Bush semnalele erau adevarate sunete de alarma, lucrurile o luau in jos, ... si totusi NICI republicanii nu au facut nimic sa schimbe situatia, sa interzica anumite practici "creative" in domeniul imobiliarului care nu mai aveau nimic a face cu acea propunere a lui Carter ...
Chiar acum 3 ani daca se facea ceva, se mai puteau indrepta lucrurile ...
(sa nu-mi vii cu Congresul democrat, fiindca ... acele propuneri nici macar nu au ajuns la Congres )
Sa nu ma intelegi gresit, nu tin cu democratii aici, Carter a fost un prost, iar Bill Clinton un trepadush, ...
insa nu cred in stinga/dreapta, nu cred ca cocioabele date sarantocilor au provocat aceasta criza financiara ...
cred insa ca GREED'ul a fost lasat sa se lafaie intr'un dezmatz total, si ambele forme de guvernamint sint responsabile de acest lucru.
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