Thursday, February 26, 2009

Mos Grigore takes a closer look at "...correlation is charlatanism"




"This is an EXCELLENT essay ...
Well thought out and presented."
Mos Grigore


A year ago, it was hardly unthinkable that a math wizard like David X. Li might someday earn a Nobel Prize.
After all, financial economists—even Wall Street quants—have received the Nobel in economics before, and Li's work on measuring risk has had more impact, more quickly, than previous Nobel Prize-winning contributions to the field.

Today, though, as dazed bankers, politicians, regulators, and investors survey the wreckage of the biggest financial meltdown since the Great Depression, Li is probably thankful he still has a job in finance at all. Not that his achievement should be dismissed. He took a notoriously tough nut—determining correlation, or how seemingly disparate events are related—and cracked it wide open with a simple and elegant mathematical formula, one that would become ubiquitous in finance worldwide.

For five years, Li's formula, known as a Gaussian copula function, looked like an unambiguously positive breakthrough, a piece of financial technology that allowed hugely complex risks to be modeled with more ease and accuracy than ever before. With his brilliant spark of mathematical legerdemain, Li made it possible for traders to sell vast quantities of new securities, expanding financial markets to unimaginable levels.
His method was adopted by everybody from bond investors and Wall Street banks to ratings agencies and regulators. And it became so deeply entrenched—and was making people so much money—that warnings about its limitations were largely ignored.

Articolul este foarte lung (insa interesant)... si se incheie asa:

Then the model fell apart. Cracks started appearing early on, when financial markets began behaving in ways that users of Li's formula hadn't expected. The cracks became full-fledged canyons in 2008—when ruptures in the financial system's foundation swallowed up trillions of dollars and put the survival of the global banking system in serious peril.

"Li can't be blamed," says Gilkes of CreditSights. After all, he just invented the model. Instead, we should blame the bankers who misinterpreted it. And even then, the real danger was created not because any given trader adopted it but because every trader did. In financial markets, everybody doing the same thing is the classic recipe for a bubble and inevitable bust.

Nassim N. Taleb, hedge fund manager and author of The Black Swan, is particularly harsh when it comes to the copula. "People got very excited about the Gaussian copula because of its mathematical elegance, but the thing never worked," he says. "Co-association between securities is not measurable using correlation," because past history can never prepare you for that one day when everything goes south. "Anything that relies on correlation is charlatanism."

Li has been notably absent from the current debate over the causes of the crash. In fact, he is no longer even in the US. Last year, he moved to Beijing to head up the risk-management department of China International Capital Corporation. In a recent conversation, he seemed reluctant to discuss his paper and said he couldn't talk without permission from the PR department. In response to a subsequent request, CICC's press office sent an email saying that Li was no longer doing the kind of work he did in his previous job and, therefore, would not be speaking to the media.
In the world of finance, too many quants see only the numbers before them and forget about the concrete reality the figures are supposed to represent. They think they can model just a few years' worth of data and come up with probabilities for things that may happen only once every 10,000 years. Then people invest on the basis of those probabilities, without stopping to wonder whether the numbers make any sense at all.


As Li himself said of his own model: "The most dangerous part is when people believe everything coming out of it."
(intreg articolul: Recipe for Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street )

5 comments:

vics said...

pina la urma,Mos Grigutza ...
parca vad ca vei ajunge la intuitia mea ...

ca aceasta criza financiara nu are nimica a face cu stinga-dreapta, comunism-capitalism, democrati-republicani, ... case pentru sarantoci,

ci cu niste jalnice "pozne" criminale ale unor sharlatani si sharks, ...
care au profitat de politicile guvernamentalo-fiscale (existente sau create pentru cu totul alte obiective)

si au umflat balonul (nu doar in Real Estate) ...
din care apoi s-au infruptat toti corbii din elita de banci si investitii ...
care au extras niste profituri uriase, ...
umflind balonul si mai tare ...

creind o ispita IREZISTIBILA si pentru hraparetii din Europa, Rusia, Asia (... ceva de soiul: "apoi noi de ce NU, cucoana ...")

Anonymous said...

Sehe, iartă-mă că mă bag în discuţie, dar cred că tu ai dreptate ...parţial. Spun asta fiindcă ceea ce numeşti corect "umflarea balonului" nu ar fi fost cu putinţă fără ridicarea barierelor şi controalelor SEC. Asta s-a făcut în numele unui "laissez faire" foaaaarte ideologic, grozaaaav de neo conservator promovat tâmpeşte de Onor Administraţia Bush.

vics said...

"Asta s-a făcut în numele unui "laissez faire" foaaaarte ideologic, grozaaaav de neo conservator promovat tâmpeşte de Onor Administraţia Bush."

draga ScS, eu apreciez interventiile tale, asa ca nu te mai scuza ...

Adevarul e ca eu nu ma grabesc sa alipesc "laissez fair`ul" ... de o administratie sau alta.
Cu toate ca clasic se zice ca "free market" este apanajul republicanilor ..., din cauza de lipsa de diferentza, in zilele noastre, ... intre stinga-dreapta, democrati-republicani, ...

practica a demonstrat ca o gramada de masuri de "regularizare" (adica gov.control pe "laissez faire")
s-au petrecut in cadrul administratiei Reagan ...,
si
masuri de "de-regularizare" adica de "drop gov. controls", s-au faptuit sub Clinton ...
Deci, taman invers de cum le tot sloganeste ALAMAR ...

E drept ca administratia Bush a avut OCAZIA fenomenala sa repare lucrurile prin 2005, ... insa a dormit pe ea, iar cind a luat masuri ... le-a luat taman pe DOS.

Sistemele "free market" sint cele mai bune, ... insa este criminal sa nu injectezi in ele niste "control-keys" care sa clinckane din cind in cind ...

vics said...

De aia ma mir ca Greenspan, nu a design`at niste controale in acel "free market" ...

si a permis aceasta debandada ... practic lasind institutiile bancare si de investitii,
pe mina unor tipi care apartin mai curind de institutii penitenciare !

Are insa o circumstantza atenuanta, ...
fiind muzician, o fi crezut ca are de a face cu o "orchestra" serioasa si profesionista !
Nimic pe lumea asta nu functioneaza ca o orchestra ...

Anonymous said...

Sehe, încep cu o paranteză: tu eşti şi rămâi o simpatică!
La obiect, eu ziceam că laissez faire-ul le-a luat minţile unor gorobeţi de la SEC. Ăştia au permis, cred că prin 2004, unor banci (mari de tot, vreo 4-5)sa emită acţiuni pe bani împrumutaţi fara să mai fie obligaţi să deţină garanţii "pe bune", în pivniţă. Sutele de miliarde eliberate, au mers la celebrele "derivatives", umflând balonul de care ziceai.
Vezi, eu de fapt nu te contraziceam, adăugam doar ca pungaşiile n-ar fi fost posibile fără ca ad-ţia să închidă ochii.
Şi gâlmele de care ziceam, se mai şi justifică:
ci-că s-au bazat pe instinctul de conservare al bancilor, cum ca acesta (instinctul care-va-să-zică) n-o să lase băncile să se sinucidă. Ha! Păi nu se sinucide nimeni. Directorii au luat salariile şi bonus-urile şi golden şut-urile în fund şi duşi au fost. Şi ne-au lăsat cu problema "salvării sistemului" evident pe banii contribuabililor. Şi stai că nu se ştie dacă s-a găsit remediul...